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BRIGHT “IDEA” OR MISSING THE MARK?:  THE THIRD CIRCUIT
RESTRICTS REIMBURSEMENT FOR RESIDENTIAL
PLACEMENT UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
NICOLE PEDI*
“There is no doubt that many children benefit from placements at
exclusive residential facilities . . . . At the same time, many of those
placements . . . cost more than $100,000 per student per year.  Given
the stakes, few educational decisions are as significant as whether a
public school district must pay for a private residential placement.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: COUNTING THE COSTS OF A FREE EDUCATION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) has a clear
goal: to provide handicapped students with the right to an education ca-
tered to their particular needs and disabilities.2  While the goal of the
IDEA is clear, disagreement between parents and school districts over ap-
propriate education services demonstrates the practical complications the
IDEA creates.3  Specific difficulties arise when parents unilaterally pursue
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law.  This Casebrief
would not exist without the unwavering support of my amazing parents and family.
I would also like to thank the Villanova Law Review, especially Megan Pownall,
Tommy Reilly, Kelsey Hughes-Blaum, Samantha Peruto, and Nick Carroll, for your
invaluable feedback and constant encouragement.  I also extend my sincerest
appreciation to Marion Walsh, whose professional feedback made this work
possible.  This Casebrief is dedicated to the loving memory of my grandfather, Jack
Hellmann, who believed in my academic career enough to inspire it in the first
place.  Thanks to you, Pop-pop, I did this one my way.
1. Mark Walsh, Supreme Court Declines Appeal on IDEA Residential Placements,
EDUC. WEEK (June 24, 2013, 9:33 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_
law/2013/06/supreme_court_acts_on_appeal_o.html (quoting appellate brief
filed by former United States Solicitor General Neal K. Katyal).  Katyal filed a
petition with the United States Supreme Court seeking review of a Tenth Circuit
decision granting reimbursement for unilateral residential placement. See Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel.
Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-1175), 2013 WL 1247971
[hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari], cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
2. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Services That Must Be Pro-
vided by Federally Assisted Schools Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) (20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq.), 161 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 2[a] (2000) (“The initial
purpose of IDEA, as interpreted by the courts, was to remedy the condition of the
more than half of all handicapped children in the United States who were not
receiving an education appropriate to their needs.”).
3. See Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, State Educational Agencies and Special
Education: Obligations and Liabilities, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 62, 62 (2000) (“Disputes
between parents of children with disabilities and school officials regarding the spe-
(847)
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residential placement to ensure an adequate education for their child.4
Such challenges surface not only due to the financial hardship that resi-
dential tuition places on school districts, but also due to the complexity of
students’ disabilities.5
Despite multiple references to difficulties interpreting the IDEA and
its practical ramifications, the Third Circuit has been credited with defin-
ing and clarifying proper remedies under the IDEA.6  Notably, the Third
Circuit has developed the oldest and most popularly adopted test for eval-
uating the appropriateness of reimbursement for residential placements.7
Yet, over time, the Third Circuit has reformed its analysis of unilateral
residential placements when identifying which placements are entitled to
reimbursement.8  Recently, the Third Circuit narrowed its once permissive
approach to residential placement reimbursement in Munir v. Pottsville
Area School District,9 where the court denied reimbursement for the place-
ment of an emotionally disturbed student in a residential facility.  The no-
table decision in Munir is representative of an overarching transformation
from the Third Circuit’s once broad treatment of qualifying residential
cial education of children with disabilities are reaching courts with greater
frequency.”).
4. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Applying the Forest Grove Balancing Test to Parent
Reimbursement for Placement in Residential Medical Facilities, 253 EDUC. L. REP. 521,
527 (2010) (“[W]hen parents choose to place their children in residential facili-
ties, the issue of school district reimbursement involves a more complex analysis of
educational benefits and medical services under the IDEA.”).
5. See LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA IRZYK, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 2:27 (4th
ed. 2013) (“Providing educational services to a student in a residential facility by
the public school agency can be logistically problematic.”).  Students who require
residential placement due to the compilation of educational, physical, and mental
disabilities create tremendous difficulties for courts in their efforts to evaluate re-
imbursement for such placements under the IDEA. See Dixie Snow Huefner, Spe-
cial Education Residential Placements for Students with Severe Emotional Disturbances: The
Implications of Recent Ninth Circuit Cases, 67 EDUC. L. REP. 397, 398 (1991) (designat-
ing cases “in which the student is severely emotionally disturbed and placed . . . in
a psychiatric treatment center that offers both extensive medical and special edu-
cation services,” as “[a]mong the most difficult cases” under IDEA).
6. See Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education Under the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act: The Third Circuit’s Partially Mis-Leading Position, 110 PENN ST. L.
REV. 879, 881 (2006) (identifying Third Circuit as leader “in filling in the wide gap
in the IDEA as to appropriate remedies”).
7. See Mawdsley, supra note 4, at 527 (describing Third Circuit’s test as “old-
est” test); see also Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702
F.3d 1227, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Third Circuit approach has been fol-
lowed, to varying degrees, by the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Elev-
enth, and D.C. Circuits.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
8. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5–6, Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth
E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1334), 2012 WL
115482 [hereinafter Appellant’s Reply Brief] (commenting on changes in Third
Circuit’s interpretation of appropriate residential placements).
9. 723 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 2013).
2
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placements to a more restrictive view of which services qualify for
reimbursement.10
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit’s preferred analysis of reim-
bursement requests for residential placements and serves as a guide to
practitioners litigating reimbursement disputes.11  Part II of this Casebrief
traces the history of the IDEA, from the recognition of educational ine-
qualities requiring legislative action to the present understanding of
proper residential placements.12  Part III discusses the Third Circuit’s re-
cent decision in Munir, focusing on the juxtaposition of the Circuit’s
broad interpretation of reimbursement entitlement in early cases and the
comparatively narrow approach the court employed in Munir.13  Part IV
considers implications of the Third Circuit’s departure from its once in-
clusive methodology, taking into account the goals of the IDEA.14  Finally,
Part V provides recommendations for practitioners in light of the court’s
decision in Munir.15  Ultimately, this Casebrief highlights the Third Cir-
cuit’s abandonment of its original analysis of residential placements in ex-
change for an alternatively strict standard controlling reimbursement.16
Despite the Third Circuit’s insistence that its holding in Munir is merely a
continuation of the court’s usual reimbursement analysis, this Casebrief
recognizes the transformation in the Third Circuit’s standard and seeks to
10. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 30, Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Eliza-
beth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1334), 2011 WL
4438392 (describing “unmistakable trend among the federal circuits [moving]
away from the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test toward the principle that when
mental illness . . . requires treatment in and of itself, parents must look to re-
sources other than educators and educational funding”); id. at 33 (referring to
Mary T. as evidence that “the Third Circuit itself” has departed from understand-
ing of inextricably intertwined explained in Kruelle (citing Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 244–46 (3d Cir. 2009))).
11. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s considerations, see infra notes
100–10 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of background on the IDEA and judicial interpretations
of reimbursement, see infra notes 18–81 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the evolution of the Third Circuit’s treatment of uni-
lateral residential placements for reimbursement purposes, see infra notes 100–10
and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the potential consequences of the Third Circuit’s
transformative analysis of residential placement services, see infra notes 111–53
and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of practitioner suggestions, see infra notes 154–76 and
accompanying text.  For closing comments, see infra notes 177–82 and accompany-
ing text.
16. See Anna Kessler, Recent Case, FAPE Not So Free: Parents Denied Tuition Re-
imbursement in Munir v. Pottsville Area School District, TEMP. L. REV. 3D CIR. BLOG
(Jan. 2014), https://sites.temple.edu/templelawreviewblog/2014/01/25/kessler-
note/ (“The Munir court set a stricter precedent for parents seeking compensation
for special educational services for their disabled children.” (referring to Munir v.
Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 2013))).
3
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guide practitioners in response to the court’s new reimbursement assess-
ment methodology.17
II. BACKGROUND: A HISTORY LESSON ON THE IDEA AND CIRCUIT
COURT ASSESSMENTS
The high stakes in residential placement reimbursement disputes
demonstrate the IDEA’s significance in the area of special education
law.18  Yet, circuit courts’ inconsistent interpretations of appropriate resi-
dential placements under the IDEA force parents to navigate a compli-
cated system when requesting reimbursement.19  This section provides a
brief overview of the influences that prompted the IDEA’s creation and
traces efforts by circuit courts to incorporate Congress’s goals into varying
tests to analyze reimbursement claims.20  In the absence of congruency in
the interpretation of services provided under the IDEA, this section also
discusses motive for placement, which many courts have incorporated into
their reimbursement analyses.21
A. Congress’s Not-So-New “IDEA”
Congress developed the IDEA in 1990, serving as a milestone in ef-
forts to transform educational opportunities for handicapped students.22
The IDEA expresses Congress’s intention “to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
17. For a discussion of the changes in the Third Circuit’s reimbursement
analysis and implications of such changes, see infra notes 111–53 and accompany-
ing text.
18. See Walsh, supra note 1 (referring to importance of reimbursement
disputes).
19. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 2–3 (commenting on
varying court views on entitlement to reimbursement under IDEA).
20. For a discussion of the tests developed by the Third, Seventh, Fifth, and
Tenth Circuits, see infra notes 31–62 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of cases considering motive for placement, see infra notes
63–81 and accompanying text.
22. See LaDonna L. Boeckman, Bestowing the Key to Public Education: The Effects
of Judicial Determinations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act on Disabled
and Nondisabled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 855, 865 (1998) (tracing history of
IDEA’s development).  In 1965, Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA), requiring public school districts to “meet the educational
needs of educationally deprived children in economically disadvantaged loca-
tions.” See Wooster, supra note 2, § 2[a].  While intended as a response to disabled
students’ “total exclusion from the classroom,” the ESEA failed to provide suffi-
cient educational opportunities to disabled children and was subsequently re-
placed by the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) in 1970. See id.  As part of
amendments to the EHA in 1990, Congress renamed EHA the IDEA and “re-
vamped” the educational program. See id.
4
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unique needs . . . .”23  The IDEA requires that a state receiving federal
education funding provide a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE)
to qualifying children with disabilities.24  To provide a FAPE, school dis-
tricts must develop an “individualized education program” (IEP) for quali-
fying students that outlines individualized goals and current academic
achievement levels.25  School districts satisfy FAPE obligations by design-
ing an IEP “reasonably calculated” to allow the particular student to re-
ceive “meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual
potential.”26
Under the IDEA, parents who believe that a public school district is
not providing a FAPE for their qualifying child may unilaterally place that
child in an alternative private school and then seek reimbursement from
the school district for the tuition costs.27  Parents are entitled to reim-
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (quoting purpose listed for IDEA).
Congress’s findings revealed the importance of “[i]mproving educational results
for children with disabilities . . . .” Id. § 1400(c)(1).
24. See id. § 1412(a)(1) (containing FAPE requirement).
25. See id. § 1414(d) (describing school district obligations).
26. P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 729–30
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194,
198 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mary T. v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing school districts’ FAPE
obligations).  As the creation of a proper IEP satisfies the FAPE requirement under
the IDEA, school districts are not required to “maximize the potential” of each
handicapped student. See T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., West-
chester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 n.21 (1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Alternatively, the FAPE guaranteed in the statute seeks to provide “a
basic floor of opportunity” for all handicapped students. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at
200.
27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (regulating payment following unilateral
private placement); David S. Doty, A Desperate Grab for Free Rehab: Unilateral Place-
ments Under IDEA for Students with Drug and Alcohol Addictions, 2004 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 249, 253 (2004) (describing development of “basic principles governing tui-
tion reimbursement under IDEA” (citing Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993); Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ.
of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985))).  Doty credits the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Burlington with recognizing reimbursement as a possible remedy and for-
mulating the corresponding test for reimbursement entitlement. See id. at 253; see
also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (recognizing validity of reimbursement remedies
under IDEA: “[W]e are confident that by empowering the court to grant ‘appro-
priate’ relief Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as
an available remedy in a proper case.”).
The IDEA’s “broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE,”
combined with the potential lack of adequate public education programs to ad-
dress a disabled student’s particular needs, have been credited as the reasons be-
hind permitting disabled students to receive a proper private education at the
school district’s expense. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238
(2009); see also Carter, 510 U.S. at 12 (noting IDEA enables courts “to order school
authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special educa-
tion for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than
a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.” (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Nonetheless, while the IDEA provides par-
5
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bursement for such alternative private placements only if the student’s
public school district failed to provide the child with a FAPE and the new
placement is deemed appropriate.28  In certain instances, parents con-
sider alternative placement in a private residential facility as necessary for
their child to obtain educational benefits not otherwise available through
public school.29  Should a court determine that residential placement is
necessary to provide a child with an appropriate education, the school
district must pay all placement costs, including non-medical care and
room and board.30
B. Setting the Curve: Competing Circuit Tests to Determine “Appropriate”
Residential Placement
While parents are reimbursed for a child’s enrollment in an appropri-
ate alternative placement, complications arise when a residential facility
combines both educational and mental health services.31  Placement in
residential facilities is to be at no cost to parents only “[i]f placement in a
public or private residential program is necessary to provide special educa-
ents with the right to enroll their children in private schools without the consent of
state or local officials, parents exercise this right “at their own financial risk.” Bur-
lington, 471 U.S. at 373–74.
28. See Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242 (“A court may grant tuition reimbursement if
the School District failed to provide the required FAPE and the parents sought an
appropriate private placement.”); see also Carter, 510 U.S. at 15 (noting parents “are
entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public
placement violated IDEA and that the private school placement was proper under
the Act”).  In Carter, the Supreme Court additionally confirmed that courts are
entitled to incorporate equitable considerations into their reimbursement exami-
nations. See id. at 16 (“Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA
must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level
of reimbursement that should be required.”).
29. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir.
1981) (referring to “consistency of programming and environment” offered at resi-
dential placement as “critical” to handicapped child’s “ability to learn” due to com-
plexity of disabilities).
30. See Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d
635, 638 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing school districts are required to provide resi-
dential placements when necessary).  The Clovis court referred to inclusion of “res-
idential schools” in the EHA’s definition of elementary and secondary schools as
evidence of school district responsibility for residential placements. See id. (citing
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(9)–(10)).  The Clovis court also referred to Congress’s expla-
nation in “pertinent regulations.” See id. (“[I]f placement in a public or private
residential program is necessary to provide special education and related services
to a [child with a disability], the program, including non-medical care and room
and board, must be at no cost to the parents of the child.” (quoting 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.302 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 2–3 (“The circuits
have struggled for years to delineate the boundaries of school districts’ obligation
to provide their students with a free appropriate public education in cases where
the child’s mental health needs require the child to be placed at a residential
facility.”).
6
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tion and related services . . . .”32  Still, federal courts of appeals are split
regarding the proper test to determine whether a child’s placement is ap-
propriate for reimbursement purposes.33  As the IDEA explicitly exempts
school districts from paying for medical expenses,34 the proper test used
to evaluate residential placements should differentiate between place-
ments that qualify as “special education” or “related service” as opposed to
a “medical service.”35
The Third Circuit developed the “inextricably intertwined test” in
Kruelle v. New Castle County School District.36  In Kruelle, the court adopted
the view that residential placement may be necessary for educational pur-
poses when the placement is part of a “specially designed instruction to
meet the unique needs of a handicapped child.”37  In holding that a se-
verely handicapped child was entitled to residential placement, the Third
Circuit referred to the student’s medical, emotional, and educational
needs as inextricably intertwined.38
32. 34 C.F.R. § 300.104 (2006) (listing requirements for reimbursement for
residential placement); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(10).  “Related services” referred to
in the IDEA have a broad definition, including “‘medical services’ to the extent
that they are ‘for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only.’”  Mawdsley, supra note
4, at 524 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A)).
33. See Mawdsley, supra note 4, at 527 (“Federal courts of appeal, in the ab-
sence of direction from the Supreme Court, have designed three separate tests to
use in assessing whether parent residential placements can be considered to be
appropriate for purposes of reimbursement.”).
34. For a discussion of the categories of services that the IDEA allows reim-
bursement for, see infra note 35.
35. See, e.g., Clovis, 903 F.2d at 638 (noting need to determine whether stu-
dent’s placement was “related service” or “medical service” in order to establish
whether reimbursement is owed).  The IDEA’s definition of “related services” pro-
vides an exemption for “medical services,” rendering them not entitled to reim-
bursement under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17).  Still, the IDEA also
provides no definition of medical services or guidance on how courts should differ-
entiate such medical services from related services. See Clovis, 903 F.2d at 638.
36. 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Huefner, supra note 5, at 398 (discuss-
ing “inseverability test” developed in Kruelle).
37. See Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 694 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(6)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (describing court’s central inquiry).
38. See id. at 687; see also Huefner, supra note 5, at 398 (describing inextricably
intertwined test).  Huefner points to the court’s opinion in Kruelle as an instance
where the court invoked “the unseverability of medical, emotional, and educa-
tional needs” in order to justify free residential placement for a student with severe
disabilities. See id.
The court’s reimbursement analysis in Kruelle focused only on whether the
services the child was receiving in the residential facility satisfied the IDEA’s defini-
tion of “special education” services. See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E.
ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2857
(2013).  The court did not alternatively analyze whether the services would fit
under the category of “related services,” for which the IDEA also entitles reim-
bursement. See id. (addressing Kruelle court’s silence “as to the scope of the term
‘related services’”).  Nevertheless, in subsequent cases considering whether to
adopt the test developed in Kruelle, courts often “conflate the two statutory provi-
sions.” See id. (citing Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 298
7
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In Kruelle, the court considered the appropriateness of residential
placement for Paul Kruelle, a thirteen-year-old suffering from cerebral
palsy and extreme physical, mental, and emotional inflictions.39  While
the school district alleged that Paul’s residential placement was necessary
“for reasons of medical and domiciliary care, not for educational pur-
poses,” the court recognized that the reach of educational instruction is
“necessarily broad” to effectively address the specialized needs of severely
handicapped children like Paul.40  Therefore, when a student’s medical
and educational needs cannot be segregated, residential placement is ap-
propriate, even when non-academic services are necessary.41
(5th Cir. 2009); Dale M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Bradley-Bourbonnais
High Sch. Dist. No. 307, 237 F.3d 813, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2001); Clovis, 903 F.2d at
643–44).
39. See Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 688–89 (describing Paul’s emotional and physical
problems).  The court described Paul as “profoundly retarded” with “the social
skills of a six month old child” and an I.Q. “well below thirty.” Id. at 688.  Paul is
unable to walk, dress, or eat without the assistance of an aid, is not toilet trained,
does not speak, and has an “extremely low” “receptive communication” level. See
id. at 688–89.  Further, Paul has a “history of emotional problems” which lead to
“choking and self-induced vomiting when experiencing stress.” Id. at 689 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
40. See id. at 693; see also Vander Malle v. Ambach, 667 F. Supp. 1015, 1038
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Because Congress intended to provide education for all children
‘regardless of the severity of their handicaps,’ education within the meaning of the
Act must necessarily be broadly interpreted.” (citation omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(2)(C))).  The Third Circuit based its creation of the inextricably inter-
twined test on its understanding of Congress’s intentions when passing the IDEA.
See Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 690–91 (discussing reasons behind IDEA’s passage).  Specifi-
cally, the court noted that Congress recognized the “broad range of special needs
presented by [children with disabilities], the lack of agreement within the medical
and educational professions on what constitutes an appropriate education, and the
tradition of state and local control over educational matters . . . .” Id. at 691.
41. See Huefner, supra note 5, at 398 (commenting on court’s interpretation
in Kruelle).  Huefner explained the court’s understanding that “[f]or some, the
need for extensive special education and related services is inextricably inter-
twined with their physical and mental health needs, with the latter needs contrib-
uting heavily to the educational needs.” Id.  The court’s holding suggested a
distinction between cases where a student’s special education and health needs are
inextricably intertwined, versus those cases where medical issues are severable
from educational needs. See Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693.  In the former case, the provi-
sion of mental or physical health treatment is necessary for particular students to
experience any educational benefit. See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Breen,
853 F.2d 853 (11th Cir. 1988) (ordering reimbursement for placement in residen-
tial facility that provided both psychiatric and educational services); Clevenger v.
Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1984) (same); B.G. ex rel. F.G. v.
Cranford Bd. of Educ., 702 F. Supp. 1140 (D.N.J. 1988), supplemented, 702 F. Supp.
1158 (D.N.J. 1988) (same); Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn.
1981) (same).  Alternatively, in “severable” cases, the disabled students at hand are
capable of receiving special educational benefits through the provision of aca-
demic services in a non-residential setting. See Huefner, supra note 5, at 398.
While the student’s particular disabilities may also require separate medical resi-
dential treatment for emotional, behavioral, mental, or physical problems, such
issues are considered secondary to educational needs. See, e.g., Burke Cnty. Bd. of
Educ. v. Denton ex rel. Denton, 895 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying reimburse-
8
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Ultimately, the Kruelle court found Paul’s “social, emotional, medical
and educational problems to be so intertwined ‘that realistically it is not
possible for the court to perform the Solomon-like task of separating
them.’”42  Thus, Paul’s combination of emotional, mental, educational,
and physical issues manifested the need for a residential setting to provide
the consistency and structure necessary for any level of learning.43  Al-
though Paul’s residential services would include non-educational treat-
ment in light of his medical needs, the court held that such services are
still covered under the IDEA, noting “[w]here basic self-help and social
skills such as toilet training, dressing, feeding and communication are
lacking, formal education begins at that point.”44
In Dale M. ex rel. Alice M v. Board of Education of Bradley–Bourbonnais
High School District No. 307,45 the Seventh Circuit rejected the Third Cir-
cuit’s inextricably intertwined test, instead choosing to evaluate the appro-
priateness of residential placements based on the primary purpose of the
placement.46  Concerned that the inextricably intertwined test would lead
to overly inclusive coverage under the IDEA, the majority in Dale M. in-
stead held that a residential facility is appropriate for placement only
when it is considered “primarily educational.”47  Unlike the Third Cir-
cuit’s broad definition of “support services,” the Seventh Circuit’s “prima-
ment for residential placement due to severability of emotional and educational
needs); Cain v. Yukon Pub. Schs., Dist. I-27, 775 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1985) (same);
Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Davis, 742 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1984) (same); Hall ex. rel.
Allread v. Freeman, 700 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (same); Garrick B. ex rel.
Gary B. v. Curwensville Area Sch. Dist., 669 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (same);
Ahern v. Keene, 593 F. Supp. 902 (D. Del. 1984) (same).
42. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 694 (quoting North. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp.
136, 141 (D.D.C. 1979)).  The Kruelle court drew from past cases that “actually
collapsed the distinction by declaring the impossibility of separating emotional
and educational needs in complex cases,” and applied similar logic to the case at
hand. See id. at 693 (citing North, 471 F. Supp. at 141); see also Huefner, supra note
5, at 398 (describing “the now well accepted view” developed in North and Kruelle
that emotional and behavioral goals must sometimes accompany academic goals in
effort to achieve overarching educational progress).
43. See Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 694 (“[H]ere, consistency of programming and
environment is critical to Paul’s ability to learn, for the absence of a structured
environment contributes to Paul’s choking and vomiting which, in turn, interferes
fundamentally with his ability to learn.”).
44. See id. at 693 (quoting Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir.
1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. 237 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2001).
46. See ABA, Case Law Development, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
207, 211 (2001) (discussing Seventh Circuit’s substitution of Kruelle test for “very
different formulation” which denies reimbursement if “the support services are
not aimed at a problem that is ‘primarily educational’”).
47. See Dale M., 237 F.3d at 817; see also Mawdsley, supra note 4, at 529
(“[W]here a student’s problems are not primarily educational so that they can be
said to interfere with the acquisition of an education, a school district has no obli-
gation to provide, and thus no obligation to reimburse parents for, a placement
whose sole function is to keep a student out of jail.”).  The Seventh Circuit’s test
provides that reimbursement for placement in a residential setting merely for
9
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rily oriented” test significantly restricts the reach of reimbursement for
“related services” under the IDEA.48  While the Third Circuit’s inextrica-
bly intertwined test enables courts to consider how the combination of all
services in a residential facility will impact a child’s overall ability to learn,
the Seventh Circuit’s primarily oriented test alternatively restricts courts’
focus to only those services directly educational in nature.49
In Richardson Independent School District v. Michael Z.,50 the Fifth Circuit
also rejected the Third Circuit’s inextricably intertwined test and devel-
oped an alternative test to assess residential placement for reimbursement
purposes.51  The test consists of two parts: 1) the placement must be “es-
sential in order for the disabled child to receive a meaningful educational
benefit”; and 2) the placement must be “primarily oriented toward ena-
“confinement,” and not in response to educational needs, “stretches the statute
too far.” See Dale M., 237 F.3d at 817.
In Dale M., the court examined whether the placement of Dale, who suffered
from severe behavioral issues, depression, and substance abuse problems, entitled
his mother to reimbursement for tuition costs. See id. at 814–15.  While Dale was
enrolled in a “therapeutic day school” for “disruptive and truant students,” where
he was placed by the school district, he barely attended school and was subse-
quently hospitalized for depression, arrested for burglary and theft, and diagnosed
with a conduct disorder. See id. at 814.  Against the recommendation of the school
district to re-enroll Dale in the therapeutic day school, Dale’s mother instead en-
rolled Dale in The Elan School. See id.  The majority commented that “Dale’s
problems are not primarily educational.” Id. at 817.  Drawing on Dale’s lack of
cognitive issues and his general intelligence, the court held that “proper socializa-
tion” was actually the problem that Dale’s placement was used to address. See id.
48. See Dale M., 237 F.3d at 817 (elaborating on primarily oriented test).  The
majority described a distinction “between services primarily oriented toward ena-
bling a disabled child to obtain an education and services oriented more toward
enabling the child to engage in noneducational activities.” Id.  Only the former
category qualifies as “related services” deserving of reimbursement. See id.
(describing school districts’ limited liability under IDEA).  In his dissent, Circuit
Court Judge Ripple criticized the majority in Dale M. for rejecting the interpreta-
tion of appropriate residential placement developed in Kruelle and adopted by a
majority of courts. See id. at 818 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority not only
dooms Dale M.’s case but also sets this circuit on a course different from that of all
the courts that have interpreted this provision.”).  Judge Ripple explained that the
majority’s new test failed to recognize Congress’s intention to provide for the va-
ried, and sometimes broad, nature of services relating to education. See id.
(“[E]very circuit that has addressed the question has held that the Congressional
mandate requires the provision of a support service that is ‘a necessary predicate
for learning,’ and not ‘segregable from the learning process.’” (citations omitted)
(quoting Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693)).
49. See Mawdsley, supra note 4, at 534 (“While the Kruelle test permits a court
to consider all of the services in a residential medical facility in their total connec-
tion with a disabled student’s education, Dale M. limits the balancing test only to
those services that directly affect educational benefits.”); see also Dale M., 237 F.3d
at 818 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“That the difference between the panel majority’s
formulation and that of our sister circuits is not just one of semantics but a chasm
of substance is made starkly clear by the analysis of the Third Circuit in Kruelle.”).
50. 580 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2009).
51. See id. at 299 (describing Fifth Circuit’s formulation of new alternative
test).
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 5 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss5/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-5\VLR504.txt unknown Seq: 11 23-OCT-14 7:56
2014] CASEBRIEF 857
bling the child to obtain an education.”52  This test, incorporating “amal-
gamated elements of Kruelle and Dale M.” is a “very restrictive test” for
analyzing residential placements.53  When practically applied, the test
reduces parents’ opportunities to obtain reimbursement for unilateral res-
idential placements.54  Similar to the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of the
Kruelle test in Dale M., the Fifth Circuit in Michael Z. rejected the inextrica-
bly intertwined standard based on concerns regarding its overly inclusive
results.55
52. See id. (enumerating Fifth Circuit’s test for reimbursement).  The court
differentiated its test from the Third Circuit’s test. See id. at 300 (“Unlike Kruelle,
this test does not make the reimbursement determination contingent on a court’s
ability to conduct the arguably impossible task of segregating a child’s medical,
social, emotional, and educational problems.”).  The first prong of the test elimi-
nates a school district’s duty to pay for residential placement if the student in ques-
tion would be able “to receive an educational benefit without the residential
placement.” See id.  The second prong incorporates the test articulated by the Sev-
enth Circuit in Dale M., “asking whether the particular treatments that the private
facility provided were primarily oriented towards enabling the child to receive a
meaningful educational benefit.” Id.
53. Mawdsley, supra note 4, at 527; see also id. at 527–31 (comparing tests de-
veloped by Third, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits).
54. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Post-Forest Grove Parental Reimbursement for Private
School Placements: What About Parents Who Cannot Afford the Cost of Such Placements?,
292 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 13 (2013) (“In effect, at least in the Fifth Circuit, it is not
sufficient for parents seeking reimbursement to prove that their child needed resi-
dential placement; the parents must produce evidence that their child’s treatment
at their placement choice ‘was primarily oriented toward . . . enabling her to re-
ceive a meaningful educational benefit.’” (quoting Michael Z., 580 F.3d at 301)); see
also Jose L. Martı´n, Modern Issues in Cases of Reimbursement for Unilateral Private Place-
ments Under the IDEA, Presentation at the 2011 Tri-State Regional Special Education
Law Conference 7 (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://www.ksde.org/Portals/0/
SES/legal/conf11/02b-Martin-UnilateralPlacements.pdf (“[T]his opinion signifi-
cantly reduces the potential reimbursement parents can recover in most residen-
tial placement situations involving students with psychiatric needs.” (referring to
Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286)).
55. See Michael Z., 580 F.3d at 299–300 (rejecting application of inextricably
intertwined test).  The Fifth Circuit ultimately reversed the lower court’s reim-
bursement award of $56,000 to the parents for the tuition costs of placing their
daughter, Leah Z., in a residential facility. See id. at 291, 301.  While the district
court originally applied the inextricably intertwined test and found the placement
appropriate under the IDEA, on appeal, the Firth Circuit Court of Appeals criti-
cized the Third Circuit’s test as overreaching. See id. at 299 (noting Kruelle expands
school district liability beyond that required by IDEA).  The Fifth Circuit found
that any services that affect a student’s ability to “physically or psychologically re-
ceive an education” are potentially encompassed under the “broad language” of
Kruelle. See id. (“Undoubtedly, it is difficult to conceive of a disabled child, particu-
larly a child with mental disabilities, whose medical, social, or emotional problems
would have no effect on the child’s ability to learn and would therefore be segre-
gable from the learning process.”).  The Fifth Circuit’s alternative test attempted
to limit the reach of reimbursement entitlement available under Kruelle through a
standard that more accurately reflects the intention of the IDEA drafters. See id. at
303 (Prado, J., concurring) (“This is a necessary limitation on Kruelle’s potentially
expansive scope, as Kruelle asks only whether the placement is necessary.”).
11
Pedi: Bright "IDEA" or Missing the Mark? The Third Circuit Restricts Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-5\VLR504.txt unknown Seq: 12 23-OCT-14 7:56
858 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 847
In Jefferson County School District R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B.,56
the Tenth Circuit rejected all of the aforementioned tests, alternatively
developing its own four-point statutory test based on the plain language of
the IDEA.57  The creation of yet another test to analyze the appropriate-
ness of unilateral placements expanded the disparities in federal circuit
courts’ responses to reimbursement claims.58  The Tenth Circuit claimed
that its “straightforward application of the Act’s text,” escapes the short-
comings of the inextricably intertwined test and the Seventh and Fifth Cir-
cuits’ primarily oriented standards.59  While recognizing that the creation
of the tests formulated by the Seventh and Fifth Circuits sought to prevent
the expansion of school district liability beyond the parameters of the
IDEA, the Elizabeth E. court recognized risks that arise following the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits’ dispositive consideration of whether placements are
primarily oriented towards education.60  Specifically, the Tenth Circuit
noted that there is not a clear indication that only those placements with
services primarily addressing academic issues will best serve a child’s edu-
cational needs.61  Rather, the court anticipated the possibility of residen-
56. 702 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
57. See id. at 1236–37 (describing alternative test through which to examine
residential placements).  The Tenth Circuit’s test considers: (1) “whether the
school district provided or made a FAPE available to the disabled child in a timely
manner,” (2) “whether the private placement is a state-accredited elementary or
secondary school,” (3) “whether the private placement provides . . . specially de-
signed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,” and
(4) whether any additional services the private placement provides beyond instruc-
tion can be characterized as “related services” under the Act. Id. (second altera-
tion in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Elizabeth E., the court evaluated the unilateral placement of student, Eliza-
beth E., in Innercept, a residential facility. See id. at 1231.  Although the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that Elizabeth’s placement satisfied the requirements for re-
imbursement under the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit
tests, the court did not adopt any of these evaluation approaches. See id. at 1236.
Instead, the Tenth Circuit created its own test. See id. at 1236–37.
58. See Split Widened: Test for Reimbursement of Residential Placement Under IDEA,
APPELLATE REV. (Jan. 3, 2013, 11:23 PM), http://coareview.blogspot.com/2013/
01/split-widened-test-for-reimbursement-of.html?m=1 (crediting Tenth Circuit’s
new test with widening “an extant circuit split”).
59. See Elizabeth E., 702 F.3d at 1237–38 (comparing Tenth Circuit’s test with
Third, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits’ tests).  Specifically, the Tenth Circuit noted that
its plain language test “dispenses with the need to fully dissect the amorphous,
judicially crafted ‘primarily oriented’ standard of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.”
Id. at 1238.
60. See id. (“Unquestionably, the genesis of the ‘primarily oriented’ test is a
concern with expanding school district liability beyond the requirements of the
IDEA.”).  While the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the purpose of the Fifth and Sev-
enth Circuits’ rejection of the inextricably intertwined test, the court also desig-
nated “the ‘primarily oriented’ requirement” that the two circuits embraced as
simultaneously “over-inclusive and under-inclusive.” See id.
61. See id. (“[I]t is not at all clear that determining whether a placement is
‘primarily oriented toward enabling a child to obtain an education’ sheds any light
on the question of whether a placement provides specially designed instruction to
meet a child’s unique needs . . . .”).
12
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tial placement services that enabled “a child to receive a meaningful
education” while not generally being “‘primarily oriented’ toward educa-
tional goals.”62
C. Beyond the Final Exam: Motive as an Additional Consideration When
Evaluating Residential Placement
In addition to the use of varying circuit court tests, some courts con-
sider motive for placement when determining whether residential place-
ment is eligible for reimbursement.63  While the Third Circuit did not
explicitly discuss motive for placement in Kruelle, even courts in circuits
that have adopted the inextricably intertwined test nonetheless consider
motive in their reimbursement analyses.64  Courts’ incorporation of mo-
tive into reimbursement evaluations has resulted in a series of reimburse-
ment denials when an event “unrelated to education” prompts a child’s
placement.65
In Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of Administrative Hear-
ings,66 the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of motive for placement further
limited the potential for reimbursement permitted under the Kruelle
test.67  The Clovis court ultimately held that the parents of Michelle Sorey,
a handicapped student, were not entitled to reimbursement for Michelle’s
hospital stay following “an ‘acute’ psychiatric crisis.”68  While the majority
62. See id. (expanding on Tenth Circuit’s criticism of primarily oriented re-
quirements adopted by Fifth and Seventh Circuits).
63. See Doty, supra note 27, at 263 (“Closely connected with the issue of eligi-
bility is the issue of motive for the private placement.”); see also Huefner, supra note
5, at 399 n.13 (describing cases where courts “ruled that hospitalization for psychi-
atric reasons was essentially a medical placement and not an educational place-
ment, even when special education services were provided on site” (citing Tice ex
rel. Tice v. Botetourt Cnty. Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1990); McKenzie
v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404, 412 (D.D.C. 1983))).
64. For a discussion of the consideration of motive in a Third Circuit case and
a Ninth Circuit case, see infra notes 66–81 and accompanying text.
65. See Doty, supra note 27, at 264 (“[N]umerous courts and hearing officers
have denied reimbursement where the placement was made for reasons unrelated
to education.”).
66. 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
67. See Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 299 (5th Cir.
2009) (“Some courts applying the Kruelle test appear to have recognized the
breadth of the ‘inextricably intertwined’ inquiry and have attempted to limit its
application.” (citing Clovis, 903 F.2d at 643)); see also Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645 (revers-
ing district court’s determination that hospitalization entitled parents to reim-
bursement because child “was hospitalized primarily for medical, i.e. psychiatric,
reasons”); David C. Donohue, Note, Clovis Unified School District v. California
Office of Administrative Hearings: Restricting Related Services Under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 407, 420–21 (1992)
(describing Clovis court’s holding as having “formulated a new test which consider-
ably restricts the related services that a school district must supply for a student
with a disability”).
68. See Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645 (noting reason for Michelle’s placement).  Al-
though the court acknowledged that Michelle’s need for some form of residential
13
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explicitly conditioned its holding on the conclusion that Michelle’s place-
ment was motivated by medical needs, the court cited Kruelle when
describing its analysis.69
In reaching its holding, the court rejected the parents’ theory that
placements such as Michelle’s, which provide services “supportive” of spe-
cial education, escape exclusion from reimbursement as medical ser-
vices.70  Instead, the majority pointed to various factors indicating the
treatment provided was not primarily used to aid Michelle in benefiting
from special education.71  Such factors included the psychiatric motiva-
tion for hospitalization, the “intensity” of the psychotherapy services pro-
vided, the high cost of the placement, the “characterization” of the facility,
and the lack of educational services built in to the placement.72  The court
placement was undisputed, the court denied reimbursement for Michelle’s hospi-
talization. See id.
69. See id. at 638 (“Because we find that Michelle was hospitalized for medical,
rather than educational purposes, we reverse the orders of the District Court.”).
The court articulated the focus of its evaluation as deciding whether Michelle’s
placement was “necessary for educational purposes, or . . . a response to medical,
social, or emotional problems that is necessary quite apart from the learning pro-
cess.” Id. at 643 (citing Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693
(3d Cir. 1981)).
While the Clovis court cited Kruelle when describing the analysis used to deter-
mine the appropriateness of placement, the Clovis court unequivocally rejected
consideration of the intertwinement of medical and educational issues as referred
to in Vander Malle. See id. at 643 (rejecting “line of reasoning” that requires state
responsibility for all placement costs when child’s “medical, social or emotional
problems that require hospitalization create or are intertwined with the educa-
tional problem” (quoting Vander Malle v. Ambach, 667 F. Supp. 1015, 1039
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Despite the Clovis court’s
differentiation between Kruelle and Vander Malle, the court in Vander Malle both
cited Kruelle and adopted the Kruelle court’s analysis when evaluating school dis-
tricts’ responsibility for reimbursement. See Vander Malle, 667 F. Supp. at 1039 (cit-
ing Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693).
70. See Clovis, 903 F.2d at 643 (rejecting parents’ argument that relevant ques-
tion to determine reimbursement is “whether the placement is supportive of a hand-
icapped child’s education”).  The court noted that “mere ‘supportiveness’ is too
broad a criterion” to establish services as necessary and therefore entitled to reim-
bursement. See id.  As “[a]ll medical services are arguably ‘supportive’ of a handi-
capped child’s education,” the court identified “supportiveness” as an overly
inclusive standard contravening the IDEA’s “explicit exclusion of medical ser-
vices.” See id.
71. See Donohue, supra note 67, at 424 (“The court’s test necessitates that the
placement be primarily for special education reasons.”).  For a discussion of the
factors assessed by the court, see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. See Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645 (enumerating factors in favor of denying reim-
bursement for Michelle’s placement).  The court noted that Michelle’s daily re-
ceipt of “intensive psychotherapy” demonstrated that services provided “appear
‘medical’ in that they address a medical crisis.” Id.  The opinion also pointed to
“the high cost of her placement” due to the facility’s status as a “medical facility,
requiring a staff of licensed physicians, a high staff to patient ratio, and other ser-
vices which would not be available or required at a placement in an educational
institution.” Id.  The court additionally reiterated the need for “educational pro-
grams for handicapped children” to “meet education standards of the State educa-
14
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held that the aforementioned factors were evidence that Michelle’s place-
ment was primarily motivated by health purposes rather than education
purposes.73
The Third Circuit also incorporated motive as a determinative factor
in its reimbursement evaluation in 2009, when it decided Mary T. v. School
District of Philadelphia.74  In Mary T., parents sought reimbursement for the
residential placement of their daughter Courtney, a special education stu-
dent who suffered from various mental and emotional disorders.75
Courtney’s parents placed her in Supervised LifeStyles (SLS), a residential
psychiatric facility, following the “deteriorat[ion]” of her mental state.76
While the court relied heavily on the facts and holding of Kruelle when
determining the appropriateness of Courtney’s placement in SLS, much
of the court’s analysis focused on factors not addressed in Kruelle.77  The
tional agency” in order to qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA. Id. at 646
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Yet, due to the
absence of teachers employed by the facility, the school district had to provide
teachers who visited the facility to instruct Michelle and other patients. See id.  The
Clovis court’s factor-based analysis has received criticism from commentators who
view this more restrictive approach as “inconsistent with the purposes and findings
of Congress in enacting the IDEA.” See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 67, at 424–25
(arguing that analysis employed by court in Clovis “contravenes the IDEA’s goal of
treating all children with disabilities equally”).
73. See Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645 (pointing to medical reasons as underlying
cause of Michelle’s placement).
74. 575 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting minor Courtney’s placement in
residential facility “was necessitated, not by a need for special education, but by a
need to address Courtney’s acute medical condition”).
75. See id. at 238–39 (describing Courtney’s learning disabilities and mental
disabilities).
76. See id. at 246 (pointing to Courtney’s “deteriorat[ing]” condition as evi-
dence that her placement was in response to her need for “emergency interven-
tion and stabilization”).  Once enrolled in SLS, Courtney participated in various
programs and therapy sessions, prompting her parents to request reimbursement
from Courtney’s school district for placement costs. See id. at 244–45.  Her parents
argued that Courtney’s participation in SLS’s “token economy program,” which
enables students to “earn ‘dollars’ for good behavior to be spent for various re-
wards” was cognizant of the nature of services “offered in public schools.” See id. at
244.  Courtney’s parents also pointed to the facility’s provision of “group thera-
pies,” “Life Skills Training,” and “psychoeducational skills groups” as further evi-
dence of the educational services Courtney received from residential placement in
light of her “limited” capacity. See id. at 244–45.
Further, the parents pointed to Courtney’s unique disabilities as evidence that
she was “not capable of receiving traditional academic instruction.” See id. at 243.
The services that SLS provided to Courtney in her placement therefore necessarily
“focused on behavior modification and her emotional wellness” in order to enable
Courtney to receive the educational benefits that the IDEA guarantees her. See id.
Framing their argument in harmony with the inextricably intertwined test,
Courtney’s parents argued that “her medical and educational needs were not sev-
erable under . . . Kruelle . . . thereby requiring the School District to reimburse
Plaintiffs for Courtney’s tuition at SLS.” Id.
77. See Caryl Andrea Oberman, Autism Trends and Cases, 2009–2010, THE LAW
OFFICES OF CARYL ANDREA OBERMAN LLC, http://www.caryloberman.com/articles/
autism-trends-and-cases-2009-2010/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) (crediting Third
15
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Third Circuit focused particularly on services SLS provided to Courtney,
such as a mood disorders group, anxiety disorders group, psychological
skills group, life skills training group, and medication group, claiming
such services were primarily “designed to make her aware of her medical
condition and how to respond to it.”78
Further, the Mary T. court noted SLS’s accreditation by the New York
State Office of Mental Health as evidence of the program’s predominate
purpose of “address[ing] medical, rather than educational, conditions.”79
Ultimately, the holding revealed that Courtney’s medical and educational
needs were severable, distinguishing the case from Kruelle.80  Therefore,
the court denied reimbursement to Courtney’s parents, demonstrating
one of the first signs of the Third Circuit’s shift toward restrictive treat-
ment of reimbursement requests.81
III. FLUNKING ITS OWN TEST OR KEEPING UP WITH THE CLASS?  THE
THIRD CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN MUNIR
In Munir, the Third Circuit again addressed the boundaries of reim-
bursement entitlement under the IDEA.82  The court considered whether
a student’s placement in a residential facility that provided psychological
treatment and education services qualified for reimbursement.83  Though
the court compared the placement to those in previous Third Circuit cases
and a Ninth Circuit case, the court integrated the medically-induced mo-
tive for placement into its analysis and subsequently denied reimburse-
ment.84  This holding not only mirrors the alternative evaluations
embraced by other circuit courts, but it is also representative of the Third
Circuit’s general transition toward restrictive treatment of reimbursement
claims.85
Circuit in Mary T. as having “effectively reversed, while purporting to distinguish,
decades of analysis under the principles of [Kruelle]”). Compare Mary T., 575 F.3d at
245 (identifying medical cause for Courtney’s placement), with Brief for Appellant
at 55–56, Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-
3008), 2012 WL 6813033 [hereinafter Brief for Appellant] (noting insignificance
of reason for placement under Kruelle).
78. See Mary T., 575 F.3d at 245 (pointing to medical nature of treatment).
79. See id. (noting medical accreditation of residential facility).
80. See id. at 246 (“The present case is clearly distinguishable from Kruelle.”).
81. See id. at 248–49 (denying parents’ request for reimbursement).
82. See Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 425–26 (3d Cir. 2013)
(framing case as inquiry regarding coverage for services under IDEA).
83. See id. at 426 (describing Munir’s efforts to obtain reimbursement for
son’s placement).
84. See id. at 431–32 (differentiating minor O.M.’s placement from Paul’s
placement in Kruelle); see also id. at 429 (crediting medical emergency as prompting
O.M.’s residential placement).  The Munir court specifically compared the facts at
hand with the cases of Mary T. and Clovis, even though Clovis is a Ninth Circuit
case. See id. at 432–34.
85. Compare Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 300 (5th
Cir. 2009) (explaining treatment at residential facility must be “primarily oriented
16
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A. The Road to Residential Placement: Facts and Background of Munir
Munir stems from a parent’s challenge to the Pottsville Area School
District’s denial of reimbursement for a student’s residential placement.86
Parent and appellant, Muhammad Munir (Munir), unilaterally placed his
minor son, O.M., in two private facilities following O.M.’s multiple suicide
attempts.87  The school district previously evaluated O.M. for a learning
disability but determined O.M. was not eligible for learning disability ser-
vices or emotional disturbance services.88  Although O.M. passed his pub-
lic school classes, he continued to display suicidal behavior, requiring
multiple hospitalizations and warranting requests for district
involvement.89
Following one of O.M.’s hospital stays in November 2008, the school
district created a “Rehabilitation Act § 504 plan” for O.M.90  However, the
school district did not create an IEP for O.M.91  After another suicide
threat and subsequent hospitalization in January 2009, O.M.’s parents en-
rolled him at Wediko Children’s Services (Wediko), without formal ap-
proval from O.M.’s school district.92  While enrolled in Wediko, O.M.
towards educational improvement” in order to be eligible for reimbursement), and
Dale M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Bradley–Bourbonnais High Sch. Dist. No.
307, 237 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying reimbursement due to place-
ment’s primary purpose of confinement), with Munir, 723 F.3d at 431–32 (com-
menting on facility’s primary focus on mental health treatment).
86. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 426 (providing procedural history of case).
87. See id. at 426–28 (enumerating O.M.’s seven separate hospitalizations be-
tween 2005 and 2009 for suicide threats and attempts).
88. See id. at 426–27 (describing school district’s previous testing of O.M.).
Responding to O.M.’s pattern of suicidal threats and gestures and resulting hospi-
tal treatment, the Pottsville Area School District first conducted a psycho-educa-
tional evaluation of O.M. in 2005. See id. at 427.  The school district’s evaluation
included testing O.M. for a learning disability to determine whether he qualified
for IDEA services while he was enrolled in a Pottsville public middle school. See id.
Although the school district’s evaluation did not lead to the development of a
learning disability prognosis or development of an IEP, O.M.’s suicidal behavior
continued. See id. at 427–28 (describing O.M.’s subsequent hospital visits for sui-
cidal behavior in April 2008, summer 2008, September 2008, November 2008, and
January 2009).
89. See id. at 427 (“O.M. returned to Pottsville in the fall of 2005 and per-
formed well academically for three years.”). But see id. (“He initially decided to
take honors math classes, but began struggling academically and dropped them.”).
The court referred to O.M.’s average academic performance to dispel assertions
that “O.M.’s condition was affecting his ability to learn at that time.” See id. at 429.
Nevertheless, O.M.’s suicidal tendencies continued, and following O.M.’s hospitali-
zation in early September 2008, O.M.’s parents requested an IEP for their son. See
id. at 427.
90. See id. (describing school district’s response).
91. See id. (noting school district’s failure to create IEP).  For a discussion of
school districts’ obligation to create appropriate IEPs in order to satisfy FAPE obli-
gations under the IDEA, see supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
92. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 428 (describing O.M.’s placement).  Wediko Chil-
dren’s Services, where O.M. remained for the rest of the school year, is a private
therapeutic residential treatment center in New Hampshire. See id.
17
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received daily individual and group therapies, which included training in
social skills, emotional regulation, stress management, and conflict resolu-
tion.93  Wediko also offered a full school day with a curriculum that met
New Hampshire’s educational standards.94  After two to three weeks at
Wediko, O.M. was able to attend small educational classes and “debriefing
periods” that the facility offered.95
Following Wediko’s involvement, O.M.’s original school district re-
evaluated O.M.’s need for an IEP and offered new services in response to
his educational needs.96  O.M.’s parents nevertheless rejected the school
district’s proposed IEP because it did not provide O.M. with small classes
or the same types of counseling services he was receiving at Wediko.97  Al-
ternatively, O.M.’s parents decided to have their son complete the
2008–2009 school year at Wediko and then enrolled O.M. in The Phelps
School (Phelps) for the following school year.98  In August 2009, Munir
initiated efforts to obtain school district financial support for O.M.’s place-
ments in Wediko and Phelps, ultimately leading to a court of appeals chal-
lenge for tuition reimbursement totaling $68,752.61.99
B. The Third Circuit’s Analysis on Who Should Foot the Bill for O.M.’s
“Free” Education
The Third Circuit held Munir was not entitled to reimbursement for
O.M.’s placements in either facility, because both placements failed to
93. See id. (describing O.M.’s treatment while enrolled at Wediko).
94. See id. (expanding on Wediko’s offerings).
95. See id. (reporting O.M.’s participation in classes at Wediko).  The classes
were graded on a pass-fail basis, and there were three debriefing periods included
in every school day used to assess how well O.M. was maintaining control of his
thoughts, mood, and anxiety. See id.
96. See id. (discussing school district’s response to O.M.’s placement at
Wediko).  While O.M. was enrolled in Wediko, the facility conducted a series of
cognitive and academic achievement tests on him in February 2009, to evaluate his
“social-emotional functioning.” See id.  Wediko then contacted O.M.’s original
school district to recommend an IEP for him and provided the school district with
its findings and recommendations. See id.  In May 2009, the school district finally
offered an IEP for O.M., and in September 2009, it added a cognitive-behavioral
curriculum for students experiencing anxiety and depression, which included psy-
chological services and increased social work services. See id.
97. See id. (explaining Munir’s rejection of proposed IEP).
98. See id. (describing O.M.’s subsequent placement in The Phelps School).
The Phelps School is a residential school licensed by the Pennsylvania Department
of Education. See id.  O.M.’s parents transferred him to the new facility because
they believed that O.M.’s suicide risk level “had decreased to the point where he
could function in a less intensive environment.” See id.  Further, O.M.’s parents
liked that the school was closer to home and offered small classes and a supportive
environment. See id.  Following O.M.’s time at The Phelps School, he soon transi-
tioned to a regular special education program and was eventually placed back in
his “peer age group” before graduating. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 77, at
55.
99. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 428–29, 431 (tracing efforts to obtain reimburse-
ment for O.M.’s placements).
18
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meet the IDEA’s reimbursement requirements.100  To qualify for reim-
bursement, Munir was required to establish that: (1) the school district
failed to provide O.M. with a FAPE, and (2) O.M.’s new placements were
appropriate.101  The first prong of the test was not satisfied for O.M.’s
placement in Phelps, because O.M.’s school district had created a proper
IEP before he was transferred to the private facility.102  Additionally, al-
though O.M.’s transfer to Wediko satisfied the first prong of the reim-
bursement test, the court determined that Wediko was not an
“appropriate” placement, thereby failing the second prong.103
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that Wediko
did not constitute an appropriate placement, as the “primary purpose” of
O.M.’s enrollment at the facility was the treatment of his mental health
issues, as opposed to educational needs.104  The Third Circuit referred to
the mental health motive for O.M.’s placement as evidence contradicting
the educational claim for reimbursement.105  Additionally, the court
viewed the involvement of a clinical psychologist in formulating O.M.’s
100. See id. at 430–31, 434 (upholding district court’s reimbursement denials
for both of O.M.’s residential placements).  In evaluating Munir’s request for reim-
bursement, the Third Circuit considered the two-prong test prescribed by the
IDEA. See id. at 430 (“To be entitled to reimbursement, Munir must show that the
School District failed to provide O.M. with a FAPE and that the alternative private
placement was appropriate.”).
101. See Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2009) (not-
ing reimbursement requirements for unilateral private placements under IDEA).
102. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 430 (rejecting reimbursement request for O.M.’s
enrollment at Phelps).  The court held that the school district created an IEP for
O.M. that was reasonably calculated to meet his educational needs and thus proper
for FAPE purposes. See id. at 430–31; see also id at 434 (“In designing O.M.’s IEPs,
the School District took into account Wediko’s evaluation of O.M. and ‘incorpo-
rated virtually all of the Wediko recommendations.’” (quoting Munir v. Pottsville
Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:10-cv-0855, 2012 WL 2194543, at *9 (M.D. Pa. June 14,
2012))).  As the IEP was in place before O.M. was enrolled at Phelps, and as the
administration of such an IEP fulfilled the school district’s duty to provide a FAPE
under the IDEA, Munir was not entitled to reimbursement for the Phelps place-
ment because the school district did not fail to provide a FAPE. See id.
In considering reimbursement for O.M.’s placement in Wediko, the court ac-
knowledged that the absence of an IEP at the time of O.M.’s enrollment satisfied
the first prong of the reimbursement requirements under the IDEA. See id. at 430.
Thus, while the school district had provided O.M. with a FAPE before he had en-
rolled at Phelps, the district had not similarly provided the requisite education
before O.M. enrolled in Wediko. See id.
103. See id. at 430–31 (detailing court’s analysis of O.M.’s placement at
Wediko).
104. See id. at 429 (weighing evidence suggesting that “the primary purpose of
that placement was the provision of mental health treatment rather than provision
of special education,” in finding against Munir).
105. See id. (reiterating comments made by O.M.’s hearing officer that his
placement was result of “a medical/mental health crisis that required immediate
treatment”).  The court further pointed to testimony from O.M.’s father and wit-
nesses from Wediko to support reimbursement denial due to O.M.’s health-based
motives for placement. See id. (“This finding was supported by the testimony of
O.M.’s father and witnesses from Wediko, who ‘emphasized that Student needed
19
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treatment plan as indicative that Wediko’s services “were not focused pri-
marily on education.”106  Rather, the court identified the educational ben-
efits that O.M. undisputedly received during his time at Wediko as merely
“incidental,” thereby rendering reimbursement improper.107
In its analysis, the Third Circuit cited Kruelle, acknowledging that a
school district may be responsible for a residential placement when a child
with disabilities requires a highly structured environment to obtain any
level of educational benefits.108  Nevertheless, the Third Circuit distin-
guished O.M.’s placement from Paul Kruelle’s, because O.M.’s placement
provided only an “incidental educational benefit” arising from “twenty-
four-hour supervision for medical, social, or emotional reasons.”109  The
court noted that O.M.’s needs did not parallel Paul Kruelle’s needs for a
highly structured environment to obtain any level of educational benefits;
alternatively, O.M.’s need for a private environment stemmed from medi-
cal reasons only.110
IV. TAKING A PEEK AT THE ANSWER KEY: DISCUSSING IMPLICATIONS OF
THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S NEW REIMBURSEMENT ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit’s analysis in Munir is a departure from its once
broad interpretation of reimbursement entitlement and is instead in line
with an overarching trend in favor of restricting school district financial
responsibility for unilateral placements.111  The specific focus on motive
in the Third Circuit’s new reimbursement standard threatens results that
contradict the purpose of the IDEA and ignore the nature of complex
physical, mental, and emotional disabilities.112  Furthermore, the Third
Circuit’s failure to clarify its shift away from the inextricably intertwined
to attend Wediko in order to keep him safe from the effects of his depression,
which led to suicide threats and gestures when he was living at home.’”).
106. See id. (supporting determination that placement’s primary purpose was
medical in nature).
107. See id. at 430 (adopting lower court’s observation).
108. See id. at 431 (citing Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687,
693 (3d Cir. 1981)).  The court questioned whether the particular placement was
“necessary to provide special education and related services.” See id. (quoting 34
C.F.R. § 300.104 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See id. at 432 (distinguishing residential placement qualifying for reim-
bursement from placement that alternatively provides mostly medical treatment).
110. See id. (classifying O.M.’s educational benefits as “incidental” to his over-
all medical treatment).
111. See Alefia Mithaiwala, An Update on Private School Reimbursement Under the
IDEA: Some Good News for School Districts, MICKES GOLDMAN O’TOOLE, LLC (Jan. 1,
2010), http://www.mickesgoldman.com/mgo/articles/an-update-on-private-
school-reimbursement-under-the-idea-some-good-news-for-school-districts-by-alefia-
mithaiwala/ (referring to “growing trend” suggesting “courts are becoming impa-
tient with parents who seek reimbursement and expenditure of public school
funds to deal with students’ medical and delinquent behavioral issues”).
112. For a discussion of the potential consequences of the Third Circuit’s in-
corporation of motive into its reimbursement analysis, see infra notes 121–24,
144–46, 150–53 and accompanying text.
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test it established in Kruelle threatens to create confusion for practitioners
seeking to present cases in line with the court’s preferences.113
This section first addresses how the Munir court’s reimbursement
evaluation incorporated factors and concerns not present in the Third Cir-
cuit’s original development of the Kruelle inextricably intertwined test.114
Next, this section addresses the Third Circuit’s failure to distinguish Munir
from cases like Mary T. and Clovis, further revealing the court’s abandon-
ment of the inextricably intertwined test in exchange for a new standard
that incorporates the reimbursement tests of other circuits.115  Finally, this
section addresses the consequences of the Third Circuit’s new reimburse-
ment standard in light of the court’s failure to expresly recognize its de-
parture from the original inextricably intertwined test.116
A. New Test, New Focus
The Third Circuit’s holding in Munir exemplified the court’s incorpo-
ration of new priorities and factors into its reimbursement analysis.117
The court’s evaluation notably rejected indications that O.M.’s emotional
and learning disabilities were intertwined and ignored the simultaneous
academic and psychological treatment that O.M. received at Wediko.118
Rather, the opinion extensively focused on the medically-induced motive
for O.M.’s placement, contradicting other courts’ descriptions of the
Third Circuit’s overly inclusive construal of proper residential
placements.119
Overlooking the indisputable academic offerings Wediko provided,
the Third Circuit’s determination turned on the reasoning that Wediko’s
offerings “were directed primarily at the child’s medical or emotional
113. For a discussion of the difficulties for practitioners created by the Third
Circuit’s failure to expressly clarify its new reimbursement standard, see infra notes
141–43, 147–49 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of the evolution of the Third Circuit’s reimbursement
standard exemplified by Munir, see infra notes 117–32 and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s missed opportunity to distinguish
Munir from Mary T. and Clovis, see infra notes 133–46 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of the consequences of the Third Circuit’s new reim-
bursement standard, see infra notes 147–53 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the changes in the Third Circuit’s priorities in Munir,
see infra notes 118–32 and accompanying text.
118. See Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 433 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“Unlike the students in Mary T. and Clovis, O.M. was placed at a facility that did
offer an educational component.”). But see id. (“O.M.’s participation in some edu-
cational programs at Wediko does not conclusively establish that the purpose of his
placement there was educational.”).
119. Compare id. at 434 (“Because O.M.’s parents have not shown that they
placed O.M. at Wediko in order to meet his specialized educational needs, the
District Court correctly determined that they are not entitled to reimbursement.”),
with Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 13 (describing “extraordina-
rily broad test for residential placements” utilized by courts adopting standard de-
veloped in Kruelle).
21
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needs . . . .”120  Thus, while the Third Circuit’s opinion resolves concerns
for over-inclusivity of eligible services under the IDEA, it also eliminated
any redress for Munir despite the school district’s complete lack of an IEP
for O.M.121  Such a result fails to satisfy the IDEA’s “broad purpose” of
providing a FAPE to qualifying children.122  Alternatively, the court’s de-
nial of reimbursement, despite the district’s failure to create an appropri-
ate IEP, exemplifies a handicapped student’s exclusion from the public
education system: the same outcome Congress intended to avoid with the
passage of the IDEA.123  Ultimately, the narrow definition of “appropri-
ate” placement the court employed effectively required Munir to pay for
the district’s abandonment of its IDEA obligations.124
Furthermore, the Munir opinion stressed O.M.’s satisfactory grades in
public school as evidence that his educational needs were already ade-
quately addressed without residential placement.125  Yet, the Third Circuit
failed to reflect on the amount of school that O.M. missed due to hospital-
izations following his suicide threats and attempts.126  Had the court ac-
knowledged that O.M.’s placement sought to resolve emotional disabilities
that directly prevented educational progress in light of forced absences,
Munir’s request for reimbursement would have been grounded in a clear
educational purpose for his son’s residential placement.127
Moreover, the court overlooked O.M.’s overall success and improve-
ment while partaking in Wediko’s programming.128  The services that
120. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 432 (drawing on references to primary purpose of
placement from Mary T. and Clovis).
121. See Kessler, supra note 16 (“The court’s opinion treats the district’s obli-
gations under IDEA leniently by failing to address the lack of a proposed IEP be-
tween 2005 and 2009.”).
122. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238 (2009) (describing
IDEA’s “broad purpose”).
123. See Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir.
1981) (describing IDEA’s goal to establish “the personal independence and en-
hance the productive capacities of handicapped citizens”).
124. See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass.,
471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (“If that were the case, the child’s right to a free appropri-
ate public education, the parents’ right to participate fully in developing a proper
IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete.”).
125. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 433–34 (“O.M. was an above-average student at
Pottsville, who had no serious problem with attendance and socialized well with
other students.”).
126. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 77, at 45, 54 (pointing to O.M.’s hospi-
tal stays that “caused him to miss school” and “[h]is daily trips to the guidance
office, and leaving early from school several times” as evidence that O.M.’s emo-
tional issues adversely affected his attendance and education).
127. See id. at 54 (describing Munir’s attempt to show educational purpose for
placement, as facility could remedy attendance problems stemming from O.M.’s
emotional issues).
128. See id. at 52 (“The record suggests that it is residing at the private school
that is the key to the absence of suicide threats, gestures and attempts since Janu-
ary 2009 . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Hearing Officer Opinion) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
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O.M. received at Wediko enabled his transfer to a less-intensive environ-
ment and eventual placement back into classes with his peer age group.129
Thus, Wediko’s dual mental health and academic program conveyed a
“meaningful benefit” to O.M. in the form of control over his suicidal
thoughts and tendencies.130  O.M.’s increased control following his enroll-
ment in Wediko enabled him to miss less school, which translated to an
undoubtedly meaningful benefit for his education.131  Yet, the Third Cir-
cuit’s analysis focused on the medical emergency that induced O.M.’s
placement rather than the educational services he received at Wediko or
his resulting academic success from the placement.132
B. Dodging the Opportunity to Distinguish
The Third Circuit’s decision in Munir also restricted entitlement to
reimbursement by rejecting the opportunity to distinguish the case from
Mary T. and Clovis.133  Instead, the Third Circuit pointed to both cases as
evidence that Munir was not entitled to reimbursement for his unilateral
placement of O.M.134  While the Munir court drew on similarities between
Mary T. and Clovis with the case at hand, a number of factual distinctions
afforded the Third Circuit the ability to distinguish Munir from the cases
where courts denied requests for reimbursement.135
First, both residential facilities at issue in Mary T. and Clovis were psy-
chiatric facilities without educational affiliation.136  The minor educa-
tional services offered at the respective facilities do not compare to
Wediko’s extensive educational programming.137  Wediko’s provision of
129. See id. at 55 (describing O.M.’s progress at Wediko).
130. See id. (highlighting O.M.’s mental health milestones that led to aca-
demic success).
131. See id. (commenting on end of O.M.’s suicide attempts following his en-
rollment at Wediko).
132. See Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 429 (3d Cir. 2013)
(highlighting O.M.’s medically-induced placement).
133. See id. at 433 (noting Wediko provides an “educational component” un-
like programs in Mary T. and Clovis where facilities did not have school affiliation
or educational accreditation). But see id. (explaining that while facilities’ failure to
offer educational programs “may be strong evidence that the child was placed
there to meet his medical or emotional needs,” existence of educational program
alone is not conclusive evidence that placement in such facility is for educational
purposes).
134. See id. at 432–34 (comparing facts of Munir to facts in Mary T. and
Clovis).
135. For a discussion of the distinctions between Munir and Mary T. and Clo-
vis, see infra notes 136–43 and accompanying text.
136. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 77, at 52 (noting that Courtney’s
placement in Mary T. “was not at a school; she was in a mental health rehabilita-
tion facility”).
137. Compare Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 244–45 (3d Cir.
2009) (describing limited academic offerings), and Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal.
Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 646 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), with Munir,
723 F.3d at 428 (describing Wediko’s extensive educational components).
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debriefing sessions between classes provided O.M. with the opportunity to
discuss his progress controlling his anxieties and thoughts during his in-
struction and classes.138  These sessions exhibited a program that quite
literally intertwined O.M.’s emotional treatment with academic re-
sources.139  Such programming suggests the educational services O.M. re-
ceived at Wediko were not merely “incidental” benefits, but rather, part of
an intentional plan to address his overlapping academic and psychological
challenges.140
Instead of distinguishing O.M.’s placement in Wediko from the resi-
dential placements in Mary T. and Clovis, the Third Circuit incorporated
those courts’ consideration of motive for placement into its analysis in
Munir.141  The Munir court’s repeated references to the medically-ori-
ented primary purposes of Wediko also echo components of the primarily
oriented tests that other circuits created in place of the inextricably inter-
twined test.142  Thus, the Third Circuit’s reference to reimbursement as
contingent on a facility’s primary focus on education blurs the line be-
tween the inextricably intertwined test and the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’
primarily oriented tests.  This opinion not only demonstrates the Third
Circuit’s transition from its original reimbursement standard, but also re-
138. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 428 (explaining O.M.’s debriefing sessions).
139. See id. (describing Wediko’s combination of classes and debriefing
sessions).
140. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 77, at 53 (arguing O.M.’s educational
and psychological treatments were combined because emotional disturbance and
academic issues “were not severable”).
141. See supra notes 69, 76–81, 119–20 and accompanying text (discussing fo-
cus on motive for placement in Clovis, Mary T., and Munir respectively).
142. For a discussion of courts’ attention to the primary orientation of treat-
ment in residential placements in Munir, Dale M., and Michael Z., see supra note 85
and accompanying text.
In Kruelle, the Third Circuit demonstrated an understanding of the “necessa-
rily broad” reach of proper educational services anticipated in the IDEA, which
often made it impossible to distinguish treatment as either health-based or educa-
tion-based. See Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir.
1981) (“Where basic self-help and social skills such as toilet training, dressing,
feeding and communication are lacking, formal education begins at that point.”
(quoting Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).  The Fifth and Seventh Circuits alternatively envisioned a dichot-
omy of “appropriate” and excludable treatment and conditioned reimbursement
on services’ appearance as “primarily oriented” towards education. See, e.g., Dale
M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Bradley–Bourbonnais High Sch. Dist. No. 307,
237 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2001) (drawing distinction “between services primarily
oriented toward enabling a disabled child to obtain an education and services ori-
ented more toward enabling the child to engage in noneducational activities”).
But, as the Tenth Circuit observed when it refused to adopt a primarily oriented
standard, limiting reimbursement to those programs with a strict focus on educa-
tion overlooks the potential of residential placements that enable a student “to
receive a meaningful education” while not generally being “primarily oriented to-
ward educational goals.” See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel.
Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2857
(2013).
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flects the resulting lack of clarity for practitioners attempting to adhere to
the circuit’s new methodology.143
The Third Circuit’s departure from the Kruelle test, as exemplified by
Munir, suggests that simply demonstrating a child’s inextricably inter-
twined health-based and learning disabilities is no longer adequate to ob-
tain reimbursement for residential placement.144 Munir instead
establishes an education-based primary purpose of placement as an addi-
tional requirement that parents seeking reimbursement must meet.145
Thus, the Third Circuit’s holding requires an evolution of practitioners’
approach to reimbursement cases.146
C. Consequences of the Third Circuit’s New Normal in Reimbursement Cases
Despite the absence of motive as a relevant factor when the Third
Circuit developed the Kruelle test, in Munir, the court consistently empha-
sized that O.M.’s placement was triggered by the onset of a mental health
emergency.147  While the court’s decision to adapt its initial Kruelle stan-
dard is not problematic in and of itself, the court’s failure to clarify its
departure from its original analysis threatens significant confusion for
practitioners.148  Without express recognition of the transition away from
the inextricably intertwined test, practitioners lack sufficient guidance on
143. See Martı´n, supra note 54, at 7–8 (noting similarities between Third Cir-
cuit and Fifth Circuit consideration of primary purpose of residential placements).
In summarizing the Third Circuit’s evaluation of the appropriateness of residential
placement in Mary T., Martı´n commented on the court’s consideration of
Courtney’s placement in a “medically-oriented” facility. See id. at 7.  Martı´n com-
pared the court’s acknowledgement that Courtney’s placement was “not primarily
oriented at enabling the child to receive an education” to the Fifth Circuit’s use of
the “primarily oriented” test. See id.  Martı´n explained, “[t]hus, one could argue
that the Third and Fifth Circuit are not that far off in their respective analyses,
although they certainly use different wording and structure their ‘tests’ in different
ways.” Id. at 8.
144. For a discussion of changes in the Third Circuit’s analysis in Munir, when
compared with its analysis in Kruelle, see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
145. See Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 429 (3d Cir. 2013)
(denying reimbursement because O.M.’s placement was result of “medical/mental
health crisis that required immediate treatment” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
146. For practitioner tips in response to the Third Circuits’ new reimburse-
ment standard, see infra notes 154–76 and accompanying text.
147. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 432 (exemplifying Third Circuit’s emphasis on
motive for placement). But see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at
13–14 (describing inextricably intertwined test as mandating “public school dis-
tricts to fund a residential placement as long as the placement confers some educa-
tional benefits—regardless of the reason for the placement”).
148. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 431–32 (referring to court’s analysis in its Kruelle
decision).  Despite the Munir court’s references to the Third Circuit’s definition of
appropriate residential services developed in Kruelle, the Munir court also referred
to the health emergency that prompted O.M.’s placement, although no such con-
sideration for motive was originally provided in Kruelle. See id. at 433.
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the proper arguments that should be made in accordance with the Third
Circuit’s new reimbursement analysis.149
Additionally, the incorporation of motive into the Third Circuit’s re-
imbursement analysis following Munir effectively prevents reimbursement
for all future Third Circuit residential placements that follow a health-
based emergency.150  The Munir holding disregards the interconnectivity
between a child’s disability and ability to achieve educational goals by stip-
ulating that all treatment initiated by a health emergency is not appropri-
ate for reimbursement purposes.151  Therefore, the Third Circuit’s
dispositive consideration of motive for placement ignores overlapping dis-
abilities that require treatment even in the immediate aftermath of a
health emergency.152  Despite the possibility of a coincidental medical
emergency spurring residential placement for a student that already re-
quired such placement, the dispositive treatment of motive for placement
would automatically render the placement inappropriate for reimburse-
ment purposes.153
V. HOW TO SCORE EXTRA CREDIT IN THIRD CIRCUIT REIMBURSEMENT
CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
Reimbursement debates impose significant costs on all parties in-
volved.154  Therefore, counsel for school districts and parents alike can
benefit from adjusting their litigation strategies in light of the holdings of
recent reimbursement cases.155  Further, recognizing the time, energy,
and resources expended on reimbursement legal battles, attorneys should
149. See id. at 431–32 (referencing Kruelle, but providing no description of
factors incorporated into Third Circuit’s current reimbursement analysis that were
not similarly included in Kruelle).  For a discussion of changes in Munir when com-
pared with the Third Circuit’s analysis in Kruelle, see supra note 147 and accompa-
nying text.
150. See Doty, supra note 27, at 263 (noting connection between “motive for
the private placement” and eligibility for reimbursement).  Doty refers to a num-
ber of cases where reimbursement was denied because placement was a result of
“medical or psychiatric” reasons, “family conflict, drug abuse, or delinquent behav-
ior.” See id. at 264.
151. See Munir, 723 F.3d at 433 (denying reimbursement for O.M.’s place-
ment at Wediko because his placement “was prompted by a medical emergency”).
152. See id. (holding placement at Wediko was inappropriate under IDEA de-
spite district court’s recognition that O.M. “undoubtedly benefitted” from facility’s
educational program).
153. For a discussion of the ramifications of the Third Circuit’s dispositive
consideration of motive, see supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
154. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 3, at 62 (“The stakes in such lawsuits are
extraordinarily high, with effects that reach beyond the immediate parties.”).
155. Telephone Interview with Marion M. Walsh, Attorney, Littman Krooks
LLP (Feb. 17, 2014) (advocating for increased negotiations between all parties in
reimbursement disputes to reduce significant litigation costs).
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recommend negotiations between parents and the school district before
final placement decisions are made.156
A. Tips for Parents on Acing the Race to Reimbursement
When fighting for unilateral residential placement reimbursement,
parents have a difficult task in convincing courts that the placement is
“appropriate” under the IDEA.157  Showing academic progress and psy-
chological growth is important to demonstrate the success of residential
treatment, but as Munir indicated, progress alone will not always lead to
reimbursement.158  One special education attorney suggests presenting
testimony to portray that the particular placement is “individually tailored
for the student’s specific needs.”159  Features such as licensed teacher-em-
ployees, strong monitoring, use of proven methodologies, counseling spe-
cific to academic challenges, educational accreditation, and solid
educational programming are also all ideal factors to highlight in any resi-
dential placement.160
Frustration often accompanies representing parents in reimburse-
ment disputes based on school districts’ tendencies to mislabel disabilities
as medical in nature when unfamiliar with the complexities of emotional
disturbances.161  One special education attorney explains that parents of
students with passing grades and high cognitive levels often face an uphill
battle, even when initially requesting IDEA services, due to misconcep-
tions regarding the manifestation of learning disabilities.162  Furthermore,
school districts sometimes fail to comprehend that even those disabilities
that appear medical in nature are potentially covered under the IDEA due
156. See id. (describing “success stories” where parties reached settlement, al-
located funds to education rather than litigation).
157. See id. (noting burden is on parents to convince courts that placement is
appropriate).
158. Compare Brief for Appellant, supra note 77, at 55 (“The obvious answer to
the question of whether O.M.’s emotional disturbance was severable from his aca-
demic needs is that once O.M. was at Wediko, his emotional state immediately
improved.”), and Telephone Interview with Marion M. Walsh, supra note 155
(pointing to progress as important factor when fighting for reimbursement), with
Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 433 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]ny educa-
tional benefit he received from the Wediko placement was incidental.”).
159. Telephone Interview with Marion M. Walsh, supra note 155 (explaining
that relating methods treatment facility provides to particularities of students’
emotional issues helps demonstrate that placement was strategically selected to ad-
dress child’s needs).
160. See id. (providing suggestions for parents bringing reimbursement suits).
161. See id. (tracing challenges of reimbursement claims).  Walsh pointed to
anorexia as a disorder that school districts often do not know how to address. See
id.  She explained that districts will automatically label anorexia as a medical disor-
der, overlooking the impact it may have by preventing students from attending
class. See id.
162. See id. (commenting on school districts’ limited understanding regarding
reality of intertwined medical and educational disabilities).
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to the adverse impact on attendance that such issues create for
students.163
In light of the misunderstandings surrounding the existence of learn-
ing disabilities, settlement negotiations before unilateral placement offer
parents’ attorneys the opportunity to clarify the realities of students’ learn-
ing needs and capabilities.164  Such negotiations may enable parents to
reach an agreement through which their child’s school district agrees to
provide the student with additional services, potentially preventing the
need for residential placement altogether.165  Even if negotiations cannot
avoid the need for residential placement, parents’ efforts to work with
their child’s school district before a medical emergency occurs avoid label-
ing the placement as medically motivated if necessary after a health-based
occurrence.166  Pre-placement negotiations also save parents litigation
costs and redirect school district funding to be used on better means, such
as training school personnel to identify disabilities earlier.167
B. Instructions on an A+ Defense for School Districts
Counsel for school districts should attempt to establish a “bright line”
division between medical treatment and academic services provided in res-
idential facilities.168  Even if a residential facility is accredited by an educa-
tional agency, school districts can highlight involvement of medical staff in
creating and executing the program as evidence that a program is prima-
rily medical in scope.169  Further, school districts’ counsel should empha-
size any disparities in psychological versus educational services offered and
attempt to isolate psychological breakdowns as out-of-school occurrences,
thereby rendering them unconnected to academic progress.170
Reimbursement cases under the IDEA pose financial strains on
school districts, even if the court does not ultimately order reimburse-
163. See id. (elaborating on school districts’ incomplete understanding of all
disabilities that potentially qualify for services under IDEA).
164. See id. (pointing to settlements as best option for parents).
165. See id. (explaining benefits of early negotiations with school districts to
avoid need for unilateral placement).
166. For a discussion of the court’s focus on medically-induced placement in
Munir and the ramifications of the Third Circuit’s dispositive consideration of such
medically-based motives for placement, see supra notes 117, 150–53 and accompa-
nying text.
167. See Telephone Interview with Marion M. Walsh, supra note 155 (describ-
ing “getting the school district on board” as key to progress in treating student’s
emotional disabilities).
168. See supra note 32 (describing treatment encompassed by IDEA’s defini-
tion of “related services”).
169. See, e.g., Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903
F.2d 635, 645 (9th Cir. 1990) (pointing to facility’s use of medical staff in provid-
ing Michelle’s treatment).
170. See Telephone Interview with Marion M. Walsh, supra note 155 (describ-
ing strategies used by school districts in defending reimbursement actions).
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ment.171  Therefore, attorneys representing school districts should in-
struct their clients to take proactive measures prior to having to defend
reimbursement claims.172  Efforts to address parents’ claims of public edu-
cation shortcomings may help to mitigate the potential for lofty reim-
bursement awards.173  One commentator suggests that school districts
propose IEP reevaluation immediately upon notice of parent interest in
unilateral placement.174  Incorporating objective consultants into efforts
to evaluate the success of current IEPs or special education services allows
school districts to demonstrate their efforts to fulfill FAPE require-
ments.175  Further, if parents continue to seek unilateral placement after
reevaluation attempts, school districts have a basis for arguing that parents
failed to cooperate in the “collaborative, interactive approach envisioned
by the IDEA.”176
VI. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S GRADUATION TO A NEW
REIMBURSEMENT ANALYSIS
Commenters once credited the Third Circuit with leading the charge
in developing a reimbursement standard cognizant of the complicated re-
ality for students with severe disabilities and intertwined academic chal-
lenges.177  Yet, opinions such as Munir reveal the court’s imposition of
additional barriers that parents must now overcome to qualify for reim-
bursement for residential placements.178  Critics will disagree on whether
the Third Circuit’s transition to a narrow interpretation of proper place-
ment represents a necessary response to an overly burdensome test or an
ill-advised shift requiring parents to shoulder the costs regularly reserved
for school districts.179
171. See Doty, supra note 27, at 250 (describing “demands for private residen-
tial care” as “disastrous regardless of the outcome” due to “time, money, and
human capital” schools must dispose of when fighting requests).
172. See Martı´n, supra note 54, at 23 (warning against school district inaction
following private placement).
173. See id. (identifying correlation between school districts’ “fail[ure] to re-
spond proportionately to the challenges presented by the student’s needs” and
reimbursement awards for unilateral placement).
174. See id. (encouraging school districts to duplicate “program strengths” of
residential placements parents are interested in and to “incorporate similar ser-
vices or interventions into the student’s IEP”).
175. See id. (enumerating steps that both help to avoid unilateral placement
and also defend school districts should reimbursement case arise).
176. See id. (recommending school districts “document any instances of lack
of cooperation on the part of parents in the IEP development and revision
process”).
177. See Zirkel, supra note 6, at 881 (describing Third Circuit’s positive reputa-
tion for IDEA interpretation).
178. See Kessler, supra note 16 (identifying new standard to qualify for reim-
bursement under Munir).
179. Compare Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 299
(5th Cir. 2009) (disapproving of inextricably intertwined test as overly broad), with
Kessler, supra note 16 (criticizing narrow interpretation adopted in Munir).
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Regardless, the court’s opinion in Munir has made it clear that the
Third Circuit’s analysis of residential placements has transformed from its
initial creation of the inextricably intertwined test in Kruelle.180  The Third
Circuit’s notable incorporation of motive into its reimbursement analysis
demonstrates the need for attorneys to recognize the dispositive outcome
that results when a unilateral placement follows a medical emergency.181
While the new reimbursement standard raises challenges for practitioners
in light of the Third Circuit’s failure to admit to the significant transfor-
mation of its original reimbursement analysis, recognizing the clear depar-
ture from Kruelle will better enable attorneys to advise clients and prepare
for trial.182
180. See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 8, at 5 (arguing that “the test ap-
plied by the Third Circuit, as it revisited Kruelle” in subsequent cases, no longer
requires school districts to shoulder the costs “where mental illness affects
education”).
181. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s incorporation of motive for place-
ment as a dispositive factor in its reimbursement analysis, see supra notes 150–53
and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of litigation recommendations, see supra notes 154–76
and accompanying text.
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